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Abstract
We explore in this paper the consequences of status seeking preferences among agents
contracting with a private principal in the context of production. We examine in partic-
ular the case of envy and we show that in general envy entails augmented distortions due
to asymmetric information in optimal contracts. Furthermore if the principal neglects
the preferences of the agents with respect to status, then potentially there is under-
participation to the contract. We also show that if the principal is free to choose who
can participate to the contract, then under some conditions the principal may prefer to
contract with only a subset of potentially ￿pro￿table￿agents (that is where his utility
is strictly positive). We then ask whether contracting with agents seeking status would
yield to more incentives to exert unobservable e⁄ort. We actually show that the principal
has incentives to discourage e⁄ort. In the last part of the paper, we consider the case
of costly observation of private decisions so that we investigate whether envy encourages
non compliance or not.
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11 Introduction
It has long been recognized that individuals are probably motivated at least partly by a
concern about their relative position in the population, in particular relative to income. For
instance John Stuart Mills has observed that ￿men do not desire to be rich but richer than
other men￿(cited by Luttmer 2005). The e⁄ects of social comparisons on consumption has
been analyzed in the classic work of Veblen (1899). Recently, Samuelson (2004) and Rayo
and Becker (2004) have o⁄ered evolutionary explanations of relative consumption e⁄ects while
Luttmer (2005) provides some empirical evidence on individual-level data.1
However, the standard modelling of preferences would rather state that individuals derive
utility U(C) from their own consumption level instead of a combination of own and relative
consumption U(C;Cothers) or U(C;C=Cothers) where Cothers is a measure of the consumption
of relevant others (for instance the mean consumption in the population or the consumption
of the richest people...). As suggested by Luttmer (2005), in general both formulations are
isomorphic and hence unless an individual can a⁄ect Cothers, they cannot be distinguished on
the basis of individual behavior. This would explain why most economists would favor the
standard formulation.
Nevertheless, policies will in general a⁄ect Cothers and hence the formulation with relative
concern will generate di⁄erent conclusions compared to the standard formulation of utility.
This problem has been analyzed by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983) and Ireland
(1998) in the context of income taxation. Also, Dupor and Liu (2003) have shown that if the
consumption of others a⁄ects marginal utility rather than the level of own utility, then the
consumption of others will a⁄ect all kind of decisions a consumer can take, work e⁄ort, job
search, risk takings and savings....
In this paper, we explore the consequences of retaining the idea of people taking decisions
while being sensitive to relative income in the context of production and contracts. We model
1There is even some evidence that this pattern of behavior emerges among animals like capucin monkeys as
shown by the work of Frans de Waal. Some studies have shown that these monkeys can exhibit some aversion
to inequity in some experiments.
2a principal-agent relationship where agents have preferences toward the allocations of others.
The relationship is subject to adverse selection with respect to individual productivity. We
￿rst consider the case of a private principal that seeks to maximize her surplus net of the
transfers to be paid to agents while taking care of participation and incentive compatibility
constraints. We show that under perfect information in general the presence of preferences
with relative consumption yields to a distortion in the optimal allocation in order to internalize
the externality each individual exerts on the others. This distortion however disappears when
the marginal rate of substitution between money and production is the same at the utility
level and at the externality level. This assumption is satis￿ed for instance if we suppose that
any agent has an utility function of the form v(￿;￿) where ￿ is his pro￿t and ￿ a weighted
mean of pro￿ts in participating agents.
Under asymmetric information, the usual distortion due to the rent-extraction-e¢ ciency
trade-of depends on the presence of the externality generated by the assumption of relative
consumption preferences. Suppose that there is envy (or jealousy) then individual would
gain from having a pro￿t larger than say the average pro￿t in the population but they would
experience an additional disutility if they earn less than the average pro￿t. We then show that
it is optimal for the principal to impose an augmented downward distortion to production
in general. The intuition goes as follows: here leaving informational rents to the agents will
have the additional e⁄ect of tightening the participation constraint of the least e¢ cient type
because this agent will earn less than the others and hence is jealous. It is therefore necessary
to extract rents more than in the absence of jealousy, by decreasing production. To sum up,
jealousy amounts to a more discriminating production schedule, although one can show that
the gap between the highest and the lowest pro￿ts decreases (less inequality in terms of
monetary payo⁄s). In a sense, the introduction of envy yields to some implicit redistribution
between agents towards a more equal income distribution.2
2It is interesting to note that CornØo and Gr￿ner (2002) in an empirical analysis suggest the ￿social rivalry
e⁄ect￿as one of the possible explanations that drive people￿ s support of governmental reduction of income
inequality.
3Furthermore, if the principal neglects the preferences of the agent with respect to relative
income or consumption (hereafter the so-called "naive" principal), then a subset of agents
among the less e¢ cient might be reluctant to participate. There is thus potentially under-
participation to the contract. We also show that if the principal is free to choose who
can participate to the contract, then under some conditions the principal may prefer to
contract with only a subset of potentially ￿pro￿table￿ agents (that is where his utility is
strictly positive). This implies that there is under-participation because expanding the set of
participating agents amounts to increase downward distortion on production levels which is
ine¢ cient.
We then ask whether contracting with agents seeking status would yield to more incentives
to exert unobservable e⁄ort. We actually show that for a given production level, the presence
of status seeking preferences induces more e⁄ort as the marginal bene￿t of production is
expanded. But at the same time it also contributes positively to the size of the negative
externality when there is envy. The principal hence designs a contract that reduces the
production level in order to internalize the impact of envy over e⁄ort.
In the last part of the paper, we consider the case of costly observation of private decisions
so that we investigate whether envy encourages non compliance or not.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to a general model of
contracting between a principal and agents with status seeking preferences. In section 3, we
develop a particular speci￿cation with more details. Section 4 is devoted to the model with
unobservable e⁄ort while section 5 is devoted to the model of public regulation. Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions and notations
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of individuals indexed by ￿. Each individual
takes a decision q (e.g. production) and receives a transfer t from the principal. The utility of
4the principal when contracting with an agent is V (q;t). The utility of the type-￿ individual






where F is the distribution function of ￿. We normalize the set of types such that u￿ < 0.3








This model can be viewed as an extension of Oswald (1983) to the private principal case.
We also slightly generalizes his analysis by considering a general formulation for ￿. The
role of ￿ is precisely to incorporate any externality from an aggregate value of decisions and
transfers in the individual utility. For instance, if we denote ￿(￿) = t(￿)￿c(q(￿);￿) the pro￿t
get by the individual by taking the decision q(￿) which costs c(q(￿);￿), then one possible
speci￿cation for H is simply
H(q(￿);t(￿);￿) = !(￿)￿(￿):
where !(:) is a weight function. Then if u￿ > 0 then the individual is altruistic in the sense
that an increase in the average pro￿t in the population raises the utility. Conversely, if u￿ < 0
then there is envy or jealousy as an increase in the average pro￿t yields to decrease utility
ceteris paribus. In that case, a more speci￿c model of interest could be written such that
u(q;t;￿;￿) = v(￿(￿);￿) = ￿(￿) + ￿(￿(￿) ￿ ￿) where ￿ =
R
￿ !(￿)￿(￿)dF(￿) and ￿ ￿ 0 is a
parameter that represents the (common) intensity of envy. If the individual earns more than
￿ then the utility is increased. Conversely, if the individual earns less than ￿ then the utility
is decreased. There are many interpretations of ￿: it could be an exogenous poverty line for
instance, or it could be simply the non weighted mean of pro￿ts.
3Hereafter, we denote fx the partial derivative of f with respect to x:
52.2 Analysis
The problem of the principal is to choose an allocation (q(￿);t(￿)) for each individual subject








U(￿) = u(q(￿);t(￿);￿;￿) ￿ 0





This corresponds to a standard principal-agent model except for the presence of an externality
e⁄ect due to ￿. The following proposition establishes the properties of the optimal allocation
of decisions. For this, we denote ￿(￿) as the multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint
and ￿ as the multiplier of the externality constraint.
Proposition 1 Assuming a separating equilibrium, the optimal decision for a type-￿ indi-





















Proof: See appendix A.
At the ￿rst best, the optimal decision for a type-￿ individual is given by the equality
between the marginal rates of substitution between the decision and money for the Principal




ut. In the absence of externality (￿ = 0), asym-
metric information imposes a distortion given by the ￿rst term of the RHS of equation (1).
In the presence of the externality, not only the incentive distortion depends on ￿ through the
value of ￿(￿), but there is also a second term which appears independantly of the presence of
4We normalize the reservation utility level to 0 for any type-￿ individual.
6asymmetric information. Intuitively, the presence of the externality imposes a distortion to
the optimal allocation of decision which depends on the speci￿cation of H. Indeed, the prin-
cipal takes into account the marginal impact of the decision allocated to ￿ on his contribution
H to the aggregate externality ￿: Note that in the presence of asymmetric information, the
externality has also an impact on the cost of incentive compatibility.
Corollary 2 If the marginal rate of substitution between the decision q and money is the




ut then there is
no reason for the principal to distort the allocation rule compared to the situation where the
externality is absent.
When Hq ￿ Ht
uq
ut = 0 then the principal has no incentives to distort the allocation rule
(except that the value of
uq
ut depends itself on ￿). It su¢ ces that there exists a function
￿(q;t;￿) such that u(q;t;￿;￿) = v(￿;￿) and H(q;t;￿) = !(￿) ~ H(￿) then we obtain that
Hq ￿ Ht
uq
ut = 0 and there is no reason to control for the externality. Hence, the principal
has to distort the allocation rule only if there is a di⁄erence between the marginal rate of
substitution between q and t at the individual utility level and the individual contribution H
to the externality level.
At the top, there is no incentive distortion as ￿(￿) = 0, but obviously the correction due
to the presence of externality subsists whenever Hq ￿ Ht
uq
ut 6= 0 and ! 6= 0.
2.3 The optimal uniform allocation
Suppose that the principal restricts herself to the choice of an unique allocation whatever
the type of individual. This may happen if the good under scrutiny or the environmental
services are transferable between individuals. Alternatively, we obtain such a situation if for
some institutional reasons the principal is forbidden to price discriminate between agents.










Computing the rate of growth of rents, we have that U0(￿) = u￿ < 0, so that the individual
rationality constraints reduce to U(￿) ￿ 0. The Lagrangean is thus given by




The necessary conditions are
@L
@q
= S0 + ￿uq ￿ ￿
Z
￿
!HqdF(￿) = 0 (2)
@L
@t
= ￿1 + ￿ut ￿ ￿
Z
￿
!HtdF(￿) = 0 (3)
@L
@￿
= ￿u￿ + ￿ = 0 (4)
Hence, we have ￿ = ￿￿=u￿. Hence, either we have u￿ < 0 and ￿ > 0 or u￿ > 0 and ￿ < 0.









This equation together with u(q;t;￿;￿) = 0 gives us the optimal allocation (q;t):Note that




that is by equalizing the marginal rate of substitution between q and t for the highest type
which is the marginal type from the principal￿ s point of view. In the presence of the exter-
nality, the marginal individual utility of q should be corrected for its impact on the aggregate
externality ￿. And the same for t.









If furthermore ! = 1 and v(￿;￿) = (1 + ￿)￿ ￿ ￿￿ then we get







As c￿q > 0, then the second term of the RHS is positive and there is a downward distortion
to production due to the impact of ￿. At the ￿rst best, we would have S0(q) = cq(q;￿) ,
that is the optimal production level is the one which is optimal for the least e¢ cient agent.
The downward distortion comes from the fact that the participation constraint imposes that
u(q;t;￿;￿) = (1 + ￿)￿ ￿ ￿￿ = 0. Hence, the minimum level of pro￿t devoted to the least
e¢ cient agent is equal to ￿￿=(1 + ￿) > 0. Participation is hence more and more costly as ￿
increases and this calls for an increasing downward distortion in order to decrease the rents
left to agents. Here, the presence of ￿ induces a lower production and thereby hurts welfare.
3 A special case with discriminating contracts
Back to the case of second best price discrimination, we adopt in this section the following
speci￿cation.
De￿nition 3 (Speci￿cation) (i) The utility u(q;t;￿;￿) of the agent is a function of his
monetary payo⁄ ￿(q;t;￿) = t￿c(q;￿) where c is the cost of producing q and ￿ an index
of productivity. We assume that c￿ > 0 and c￿q > 0 (Spence-Mirrlees property). We
have
u(q;t;￿;￿) = v(￿(q;t;￿);￿)
where v￿ > 0 and v￿￿ ￿ 0.






This speci￿cation has the particularity that there is no reason for the principal to distort
production allocations under perfect information even if the agent￿ s utility depends on the








Hence, distorting production allocations across types compared to ￿rst-best only becomes
optimal under imperfect information.
3.1 Analysis
Using this speci￿cation and the results contained in Proposition 1, we obtain that:















where ￿(￿) = ￿(q(￿);t(￿);￿) is such that v(￿(￿);￿) = 0.
Replacing in (6), we have






which shows that there is a distortion of production for any type except for the most e¢ cient
one (￿).
By contrast, note that the standard model of procurement is obtained when v￿ = 0 so
that ￿ = 0: Indeed, we get the familiar condition:




10The sign of the distortion in (7) depends on the sign of ￿ and on the weight function !(:).
Let us assume that !(￿) ￿ 0 for any type. Suppose further that v￿ > 0 for the least e¢ cient
agent, then ￿ is clearly negative. This implies that if the least e¢ cient agent is altruistic then
the downward distortion due to the e¢ ciency-rent extraction trade-o⁄is reduced compared to
the standard model and may even turn to an upward distortion for some types. The intuition
goes as follows: it is less necessary to extract rents as giving rents will increase ￿ and thereby
will relax the participation constraint of the least e¢ cient type. In the case where !(￿) = 1
for any type, then 0 < ￿ < 1 and consequently the principal imposes a reduced downward
distortion everywhere on production except at the top.
Suppose on the contrary that u￿ < 0 for the least e¢ cient type, then ￿ is positive if and
only if v￿(￿(￿);￿) > ￿v￿(￿(￿);￿)
R ￿
￿ !(￿)dF(￿) which means that the direct e⁄ect of pro￿t
on utility must outweigh the impact of ￿ su¢ ciently. In that case, the principal imposes
an augmented downward distortion to production except at the top. The intuition goes
as follows: here leaving informational rents to the agents will have the additional e⁄ect of
tightening the participation constraint of the least e¢ cient type because this agent is jealous.
It is therefore necessary to extract rents more than in the absence of jealousy, by decreasing
production. In a sense, jealousy amounts to a more discriminating production schedule,
although one can show that the gap between the highest and the lowest pro￿ts decreases
(less inequality in terms of monetary payo⁄s).
Suppose that the "naive" principal neglects the preferences of the agent with respect
to ￿. In that case, it is optimal to o⁄er the standard production schedule de￿ned in (8).
However, the least e¢ cient agent will get ￿s(￿) = 0 such that his utility is v(0;￿s) where
￿s =
R ￿
￿ !(￿)￿s(￿)dF(￿). This utility level might be negative so that he is not willing to
participate and this is also true for a subset of the less e¢ cient types. There is thus potentially
under-participation to the contract.
113.2 Optimal shutdown
In this section, we analyze the optimal shutdown policy for the principal, that is the identity
of the marginal individual who is indi⁄erent between partipating and not as part of the






fS(q(￿)) ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ c(q(￿);￿)gdF(￿)
where ￿(￿) and q(￿) depend on ￿￿. Hence, the ￿rst-order condition is
dW











This is di¢ cult to evaluate because both production and pro￿t depend on ￿￿ in a complex
way. In particular, q(￿) depends on ￿￿ through ￿ when !(￿) is not constant. Moreover

































































12Hence, the rule becomes
dW







































Here, implicitely, we assume that the agent values only the pro￿ts get by participating
agents, i.e. ￿ =
R ￿￿




















































d￿￿ explains the sign of
dq(￿)
d￿￿ . Suppose that ￿ > 0 and suppose that
d￿
d￿￿ > 0 then
dq(￿)
d￿￿ < 0. Then the principal prefers to contract with only a subset of potentially ￿pro￿table￿
agents (that is where his utility (S ￿￿ ￿c) is strictly positive) : there is under-participation
5Otherwise, the analysis should be conducted with ￿ =
R ￿￿




rameter k with value 1 represents the situation where the agent includes the non participating agents when
computing ￿. When parameter k is zero, then the agent computes ￿ only on the subset of participating agents.
13because expanding the set of participating agents amounts to increase downward distortion
on production levels.
On the contrary, if ￿ > 0 but suppose that
d￿
d￿￿ < 0 then
dq(￿)
d￿￿ > 0 then there is over-
participation. Here, expanding the set of contracting agents allows to reduce the intensity of
distortion.
3.3 The impact of envy
To pursue further the analysis, let us suppose that v = ￿ + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿). There is thus jealousy





1 + ￿ ￿ ￿
R ￿￿
￿ !(￿)dF(￿)













which means that for a given ￿ the downward distortion is higher when the set of contracting
types increases. Intuitively, the participation constraint is more and more stringent when ￿￿
increases. This means in turn that
dq(￿)
d￿￿ < 0 (and consequently
d￿(￿)
d￿￿ < 0). In that case, there
is under-participation. The principal would prefer to restrict participation to the contract
more compared to a standard model without envy.
In the particular case where !(￿) = 1 for any ￿ then
￿ =
￿
1 + ￿ ￿ ￿F(￿￿)
< ￿
and




which implies that the distortion is maximal when ￿￿ = ￿. Given the second order condition
on q(:), it follows that
dq
d￿ < 0 and consequently
dq(￿)
d￿￿ < 0.
144 Does status-seeking behavior yield to more e⁄ort?
We consider an extension of the previous model where the agent exerts some e⁄ort e that
allows to reduce the cost of providing the quantity q. We will consider for simplicity the
following popular speci￿cation
c(q;e;￿) = (￿ ￿ e)q
used extensively by La⁄ont and Tirole (1991).
Exerting e⁄ort is costly and we denote  (e) the disutility of e⁄ort which is increasing and
convex ( 0 > 0 and  00 > 0) with  (0) = 0. We also assume that the utility of the type-￿
agent is given by
U = v(￿;￿) ￿  (e)
= ￿ + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿) ￿  (e)
where ￿ = t ￿ c(q;e;￿) and ￿ =
R
￿ !(￿)￿(￿)dF(￿). Facing the allocation (t;q) the agent
chooses his e⁄ort such that
max
e
U = v(￿;￿) ￿  (e)
= (1 + ￿)(t ￿ (￿ ￿ e)q) ￿ ￿￿ ￿  (e)
with the corresponding ￿rst-order condition
(1 + ￿)q =  0(e) (9)
The impact of envy is such that the marginal bene￿t of e⁄ort is higher (￿ > 0) for a given
production level. Hence, ceteris paribus, envy leads to more e⁄ort. However, the production
level depends itself on ￿ and can be found by solving the principal￿ s problem.







U(￿) = (1 + ￿)(t(￿) ￿ (￿ ￿ e(￿))q(￿)) ￿ ￿￿ ￿  (e(￿)) ￿ 0
U(￿) ￿ U(￿;~ ￿) for any ￿;~ ￿





Solving this program allows to obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assuming a separating equilibrium, the optimal allocation is such that

















Proof: See appendix B.
In the absence of envy (￿ = 0), we obtain the standard equation stipulating the downward
distortion on production as a result of the e¢ ciency-rent extraction trade-of:









(1 + ￿!(x))dx >
F(￿)
f(￿)
but there is also an additional therm that tends increase the cost of production, namely
￿!(￿)
 0(e(￿))
 00(e(￿)). This term is due to the impact of production on the e⁄ort chosen privately by
the agent which in turn a⁄ects the extent of the externality ￿. Intuitively, the presence of
envy gives more incentives to exert some e⁄ort for a given production level but at the same
time it also contributes positively to the size of the negative externality. The principal hence
designs a contract that reduces the production level in order to internalize the impact of envy
over e⁄ort.
165 Does status-seeking behavior yields to more fraud? (incom-
plete)
In this section we investigate whether status-seeking behavior yields to more fraud. For this,
we assume that the decision variable q can only be observed at a cost by the Principal. This
implies that in general the Principal would want to observe q at random. Facing a contract
fq(￿);t(￿);￿(￿);f(￿;q)g where ￿(￿) denotes the probability of inspection and f(￿;q) ￿ 0
whenever q 6= q(￿) denotes the penalty to be paid in case of fraud, that is when, given the
audit report, the actual decision q does not correspond to the one that should have been
taken given the type announced ￿. In case where the observed decision q is q(￿) then the
penalty is f(￿;q(￿)) = 0 (no additional payment in case of non frauding behavior). Then the
expected utility can be written as follows:
U(￿;~ ￿;q;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿(~ ￿))u(q;t(~ ￿);￿;￿) + ￿(~ ￿)u(q;T(~ ￿;q);￿;￿)
where T(~ ￿;q) = t(~ ￿)￿￿(~ ￿)f(~ ￿;q) is the expected payment in case of proven frauding behavior.
The incentives constraints write as follows:
R(￿) ￿ U(￿;￿;q(￿);￿) ￿ U(￿;~ ￿;q(~ ￿);￿) (IC1)
R(￿) ￿ U￿(￿) ￿ max
~ ￿;q
U(￿;~ ￿;q;￿) (IC2)
and the individual rationality constraints are:
R(￿) ￿ 0 (IR)





fS(q(￿)) ￿ t(￿) ￿ k￿(￿)gdF(￿)
s.t. (IC1);(IC2);(IR); f(￿;q) ￿ ￿ f; 0 ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ 1
where k is the unit cost of inspection and
It is not easy to see where (IC2) is binding given the generality of the model. Note also
that from (IC1), we get _ R(￿) = u￿(q(￿);t(￿);￿;￿) < 0.




















= (1 + ￿)
h
(1 ￿ ￿(~ ￿))t(~ ￿) + ￿(~ ￿)T(~ ￿;q)
i
￿ (1 + ￿)c(q;￿) ￿ ￿￿
= (1 + ￿)
h
t(~ ￿) ￿ ￿(~ ￿)f(~ ￿;q)
i
￿ (1 + ￿)c(q;￿) ￿ ￿￿
and
R(￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)(t(￿) ￿ c(q(￿);￿)) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)
￿
t(~ ￿) ￿ c(q(~ ￿);￿)
￿
￿ ￿￿ (IC1)
R(￿) ￿ U￿(￿) ￿ max
~ ￿;q
U(￿;~ ￿;q;￿) = (1 + ￿)K ￿ (1 + ￿)c(q￿(￿);￿) ￿ ￿￿ (IC2)
where K = max~ ￿ t(~ ￿) ￿ ￿(~ ￿) ￿ f and q￿(￿) = argminq c(q;￿). Thus the incentives constraints
reduce to
t(￿) ￿ c(q(￿);￿) ￿ t(~ ￿) ￿ c(q(~ ￿);￿) (IC1)
t(￿) ￿ c(q(￿);￿) ￿ K ￿ c(q￿(￿);￿) (IC2)








as c￿q > 0 and q￿(￿) ￿ q(￿). This implies that (IC2) reduces to6





Moreover, the de￿nition of K implies that for any ￿;
K ￿ t(￿) ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ f
6If on the contrary we make the opposite assumption w.r.t the single crossing condition, i.e. c￿q < 0; then
(IC2) would reduce to R(￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)(K ￿ c(q
￿(￿);￿)) ￿ ￿￿.










+ c(q(￿);￿) ￿ K
￿
The program of the Principal then rewrites as follows, assuming that q(￿) ￿ q￿(￿) for any








￿ c(q(￿);￿) ￿ k￿(￿)gdF(￿)
s.t.
_ R(￿) = ￿(1 + ￿)c￿(q(￿);￿)












+ c(q(￿);￿) ￿ K
￿





where the last constraint comes from the de￿nition of ￿ together with ￿(￿) =
R(￿)+￿￿
1+￿ :
Note that the constraint on ￿ should be binding as ￿ is costly from the Principal￿ s






























Furthermore, as leaving rents is costly too, the participation constraint on R(￿) should be
binding:
R(￿) = 0:





























































_ R(￿) + (1 + ￿)c￿(q(￿);￿)
￿
d￿















































































together with ￿(￿) = 0 as R(￿) is free.
We deduce that ￿ =
￿




















































+ c(q(￿);￿) ￿ c(q￿(￿);￿)
￿
> 0
as long as q(￿) > q￿(￿) and it does not depend directly on ￿.
We are in a position to show that when ￿ increases then the probability of inspection ￿
decreases. Indeed, the direct e⁄ect of raisng ￿ yields to decrease ￿, but in addition both R
and q are decreasing in ￿.
[To be completed]
6 Conclusion
We have explored in this note the consequences of status seeking preferences among agents
contracting with a principal in the context of production. We have examined in particular
the case of envy and we have shown that in general envy entails augmented distortions due
to asymmetric information in optimal contracts. Furthermore if the principal neglects the
preferences of the agents with respect to status, then potentially there is under-participation
to the contract. We also showed that if the principal is free to choose who can participate
to the contract, then under some conditions the principal may prefer to contract with only
a subset of potentially ￿pro￿table￿agents (that is where his utility is strictly positive). We
then asked whether contracting with agents seeking status would yield to more incentives to
exert unobservable e⁄ort. We actually show that the principal has incentives to discourage
e⁄ort. In the last part of the paper, we considered the case of a public principal that seeks
to reduce negative externalities from production under a budget constraint.
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22Appendix
A Proof of proposition 1
As usual, incentive compatibility constraints reduce to the following ￿rst-order condition
uqq0 + utt0 = 0
together with the second-order condition q0 ￿ 0. Note also that U0(￿) = u￿ < 0 so that the
































= Vqf ￿ ￿Hqf ￿ ￿0uq ￿ ￿u￿q = 0 (10)
@L
@t







￿f ￿ ￿0u￿ ￿ ￿u￿￿
￿
d￿ = 0 (12)
together with ￿(￿) = 0 as U(￿) is free and ￿(￿)U(￿) = 0 with ￿(￿) ￿ 0, U(￿) ￿ 0.




[Vqf ￿ ￿Hqf ￿ ￿u￿q]

























































































[Vqf ￿ ￿Hqf ￿ (A + ￿B)u￿q]
￿










































which concludes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 4







U(￿) = (1 + ￿)(t(￿) ￿ (￿ ￿ e(￿))q(￿)) ￿ ￿￿ ￿  (e(￿)) ￿ 0
 0(e(￿)) = (1 + ￿)q(￿)




!(￿)(t(￿) ￿ (￿ ￿ e(￿))q(￿))dF(￿)
24As usual, (IC) constraints reduce to
_ U(￿) = ￿(1 + ￿)q(￿) < 0
_ q ￿ 0
and we deduce that (IR) constraints can be reduced to U(￿) ￿ 0. Replacing t and forgetting








U(￿) + ￿￿ +  (e(￿))
1 + ￿






















U(￿) + ￿￿ +  (e(￿))
1 + ￿























U(￿) + ￿￿ +  (e(￿))
1 + ￿


















The ￿rst-order conditions are
@L
@q























f(￿) + _ ￿(￿) ￿
1
1 + ￿
￿!(￿)f(￿) = 0 (15)
25together with the transversality condition ￿(￿) = 0 as U(￿) is free and ￿(￿) ￿ 0 with
￿(￿)U(￿) = 0.















And for the production level, we obtain
















1 + ￿!(x)dx + ￿!(￿)
 0(e(￿))
 00(e(￿))
This concludes the proof.
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